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Abstract—In this paper, we analyze a network of agents that
communicates through word of mouth. In a word-of-mouth com-
munication system, every agent communicates with its neighbors
with delays in communication. This is a non-classical information
structure where the topological and temporal restrictions in
communication mean that information propagates slowly through
the network. We present the prescription approach to derive
structural results for this class of problems. The structural results
lead to optimal control policies with time invariant domain-sizes,
and are used to present a dynamic programming decomposition
of the corresponding optimization problem.
Index Terms—Decentralized control, information structures,
stochastic control, team theory, partially observable Markov
decision processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
THE interdependence of many engineering systems canenable the development of a novel framework to process
large amounts of data and deliver real-time control actions
that optimize associated benefits. As we move to increasingly
complex systems [1], new decentralized control approaches
are needed to optimize the impact on system behavior of
the interaction between its entities [2]. Centralized stochastic
control [3] has been ubiquitous approach to control complex
systems [4]. Centralized stochastic control refers to multi-stage
optimization problems of systems with external disturbances
and noisy observations by a single decision maker. A key as-
sumption in deriving solutions of centralized stochastic control
problems is that the decision maker perfectly recalls all past
control actions and observations. The information available to
an agent when making a decision is called the information
structure of the system. If every agent has access to the
same information and a perfect recall of the information, the
information structure is called classical information structure.
While centralized systems have been extensively studied, their
core assumption does not hold for many applications involving
multiple agents, e.g., connected automated vehicles [5], a
swarm of drones [6], and smart grids [7]. In such systems,
all agents simultaneously make a decision based only on their
memory and local information received through communica-
tion with other agents. Such agent-to-agent communication
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might be generally delayed or costly [8]. Thus, it is not
possible to compute a centralized estimate of the complete
state of the system from the observation history of a single
agent [9]. Such multi-stage optimization problems [10] are
known as decentralized stochastic control problems.
In this paper, we study one particular decentralized system
with multiple agents who make decisions to affect the state of
the system. In the absence of any entity facilitating transmittal
of information among the agents (known as a shared memory
or a designer in existing literature), the communication among
the agents is limited by their own capacities to transmit and
receive data to (and from) other agents. We call this mode
of communication between agents word-of-mouth communi-
cation.
In word-of-mouth communication, we model the system as
a network of agents with each node representing an agent,
and each link connecting two agents representing a path for
communication. An agent may directly communicate only with
its neighbors in the network. Thus, information from each
agent propagates in the network through its neighbors who
share it with their neighbors, and so on. Each link has a delay
associated with it, which can be thought of as the time it takes
for the information to transmit from an agent to its neighbor.
This problem has a non-classical information structure because
of the delays in communication.
The model analyzed in this paper can describe many dif-
ferent decentralized systems with limited communication. As
an example, consider a discrete time problem where a team
of drones must conduct a rescue operation at an inaccessible
location. At every time step, all drones needs to simultane-
ously, although independently, make the best possible decision
given the information available at that time. Due to hardware
limitations, a drone can only communicate with other drones
within a given range. The range of the entire team of drones,
however, may need to extend far beyond the communication
range of any single drone. In this situation, the drones need
to communicate through ”word of mouth” to make optimal
decisions.
B. Related Work
Centralized stochastic control is very well studied in the
literature [3]. Decentralized stochastic control is fundamen-
tally different from and significantly more challenging than
centralized stochastic control. The most common approach
in centralized stochastic control, dynamic programming (DP),
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2does not directly work on decentralized systems since no
separation results between estimation and control are known.
Thus, new approaches are needed to address these problems.
There are three general approaches in the literature that use
techniques from centralized stochastic control: (1) the person-
by-person approach, (2) the designer’s approach, and (3) the
common information approach.
The person-by-person approach aims to transform the prob-
lem into a centralized stochastic control problem from the
point of view of a single agent. This is done by arbitrarily
fixing the control policies for all agents except for one agent
i. The control policy of the chosen agent is then optimized
for this new problem, assuming the fixed strategies used by
the other agents are known to agent i. This allows for the
use of techniques from centralized stochastic control including
derivation of structural results and DP. This process of fixing
all other strategies and optimizing the individual strategy
is then repeated for all agents until a stable equilibrium is
attained. A control policy leading to this equilibrium is called
a person-by-person optimal strategy. In general, this solution
is not globally optimal [11]. The person-by-person approach
can be used to identify structural properties for globally
optimal strategies, given the fact that every globally optimal
strategy must necessarily be person-by-person optimal. Struc-
tural properties often guarantee the existence of an optimal
control policy where all control strategies have a time-invariant
domain. This compresses the information that an agent needs
to track and allows for the reduction of the search space when
looking for optimal strategies. An early application of this
idea was found in problems of real-time communication using
encoders and decoders [12]–[16]. These problems involve a
word and two decision makers: an encoder to compress the
word and the decoder to decompress the word. Structural
results about globally optimal strategies can be derived by
fixing the decoding strategy and optimizing the strategy of
the encoder. Then repeating the process for the decoder by
fixing the encoding strategy. The person-by-person approach
has also been used in decentralized hypothesis testing and
quickest detection problems [17], [18]. In these problems,
multiple agents must make a decision about a hypothesis,
or about a noisy observation with the cost depending on the
decision of all the agents. Unless the cost is decoupled, the
strategies obtained by this approach are not optimal. However,
structural results have been used to reduce the search space
for globally optimal strategies. Some other applications have
appeared in networked control systems [19] and team decision
problems with partially nested information structures [11],
[20]. In special cases, such as team decision problems with
static information structures, the person-by-person solution can
also be globally optimal.
The designer’s approach addresses decentralized control
from the point of view of a designer with knowledge of
the system model and statistics of all sources of randomness
in the system. The designer’s task is to choose the optimal
control policy, or design, for the system. This is done by
first transforming the problem into a centralized planning
problem from the designer’s point of view, and then using
DP to derive the optimal strategy. The control action for the
designer’s planning problem is assigning a control strategy to
each agent for each time step t for which the time the system
is expected to run. DP ensures global optimality of these
assignments because there is only one decision maker. The
problem with this approach is the associated computational
complexity as the number of agents increases. This approach
was first introduced by Witsenhausen [21] for a centralized
system with one agent and, later on, it was extended to
systems with multiple agents [13], [22], where one agent is
assigned to be the designer who prescribes a control strategy
to the other agents, and thus transforming the problem into a
centralized stochastic control problem. The person-by-person
approach can compliment the designer’s approach by identify-
ing structural properties of globally optimal control policies.
The designer can then use DP to search within a smaller set
of possible optimal strategies. Examples of this approach have
appeared in real-time communication problems [13], [23], in
systems with a broadcast information structure [24], and in
networked control systems [19].
The most recent development in the field is the common
information approach developed for problems with partial
history sharing [25], [26]. It was first derived with respect
to situations of decentralized stochastic control where each
agent shares a subset of its past observations and control
actions to a shared memory accessible to every agent in the
system. Every agent then makes a decision using information
in the shared memory (the common information) and the recall
of its own history. The solution is derived by reformulating
the system from the viewpoint of a fictitious coordinator
with access only to the shared information. The coordinator’s
task is to prescribe control strategies to each agent in the
system which the agents use to generate control actions. This
approach has been used to derive structural results and a DP
decomposition for problems with delayed information sharing
from the agents to the shared memory [26]. It has been also
used in problems with sharing information structure [27],
stochastic games with asymmetric information [28] and teams
with mean-field sharing [29]. There have been also some
earlier papers that used similar ideas in analyzing specific
information structures [30]–[33].
C. Contributions of This Paper
We consider the common information approach to be the
standard approach in solving a wide variety of decentralized
stochastic control problems, including the word-of-mouth in-
formation structure. However, we find that in problems with
asymmetric information sharing among the agents, there may
not be a lot of “common information” available to the agents in
the system. The word-of-mouth information structure includes
such systems with asymmetric sharing which may not have a
lot of common information depending on the topology of the
network. Another well known example of such a system is the
partially nested information structure [11], [34] which has no
common information due to its unidirectional communication
among agents. The presence of such problems has motivated
us to investigate the existence for structural results that can
improve on the performance of the common information
3approach by taking into account the asymmetries in a system.
The contributions of this paper are:
1) We introduce and analyze a problem with a word-
of-mouth information structure and present the prescription
approach to reformulate the problem into several equivalent
problems.
2) We derive structural results for optimal control policies
by compressing information into a sufficient statistic and
present a corresponding dynamic program.
D. Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we present the model of the decentralized stochas-
tic problem with a word-of-mouth information structure. In
section III, we introduce the prescription approach along
with the associated properties. In Section IV, we apply the
prescription approach to the word-of-mouth communication
problem to derive structural results and a DP decomposition.
Finally, we conclude with some observations and potential
future directions in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Notation
Random variables are denoted with upper case letters
and their realization by the corresponding lower case let-
ters. For integers a < b, Xa:b is shorthand for the vector
(Xa, Xa+1, · · · , Xb) and Xa:b is shorthand for the vector
(Xa, Xa+1, · · · , Xb). When a > b, the dimension of Xa:b is
0. The combined notation with c < d and a < b, Xc:da:b is short
for the vector (Xji : i = a, a+ 1, · · · , b, j = c, c+ 1, · · · , d).
The lower-case letters i, j and k refer to the index of an
agent and the lower-case letters p, q and r refer to the position
of an agent in a given permutation of agents. A random
variable Xkt refers to agent k at time t. For a given permutation
of agents such that agent k is at position p, the same random
variable is written as X [p]t with respect to the position p
instead of the index of the agent. A random variable, X{k,j}t ,
associated with agents k and j is written equivalently as X [p,r]t
with respect to the agents’ position p and r respectively.
For sets A and B, {A,B} is the set A∪B. For a singleton a
and set B, {a,B} is the set {a}∪B, and |·| is the cardinality of
a set. The null set is represented by ∅. The indicator function is
denoted by I(·). We have attempted to use notation consistent
with [25] as our work is related to the common information
approach.
B. The Network of Agents
Consider a network of K ∈ N agents represented by
a strongly connected graph G = (K, E), where K :=
{1, · · · ,K} is the set of agents and E is the set of links. A
direct link from an agent k ∈ K to an agent j ∈ K is denoted
by (k, j) ∈ E . Every link (k, j) represents a communication
link from agent k to j which is characterized by a delay of
δ{k,j} ∈ N time steps for transferring information from k to
j.
When agent k sends out information to agent j through link
(k, j), we call it transmission of information. The information
transmitted by agent k at time t is received by agent j at
time t + δ{k,j}. For any agent k, the acts of receiving and
transmission of information occur at different instances within
every time step as discussed in Section II-D.
Definition 1. Let N = {1, · · · ,m : m ∈ K} be a set of
indices. For any k, j ∈ K, a path q{k,j}a , a ∈ N, from k to j
is given by the sequence {kn}n∈N such that: (1) k1 = k and
km = j, (2) kn ∈ K for n ∈ N , and (3) there exists a link
(kn−1, kn) ∈ E for n ∈ N \ {1}.
The set Q{k,j} = {q{k,j}a : a = 1, · · · , b; b ∈ N} includes
all paths from agent k to agent j.
Definition 2. Let agents k, j ∈ K with a path q{k,j}a from k to
j. The communication delay d{k,j}a ∈ N for q{k,j}a is defined
as
d{k,j}a = δ
{k,k2} + · · ·+ δ{km−1,j},
where δ{kn−1,kn} is the delay in information transfer through
the link (kn−1, kn) ∈ E .
The communication path from agent k to agent j in the
network is the path with the least possible delay. We call this
the information path.
Definition 3. The information path from k to j denoted by
(k → j) is given by a path q{k,j}a ∈ Q{k,j} such that,
d{k,j}a = min
{
d
{k,j}
1 , · · · , d{k,j}b
}
, (1)
where b := |Q{k,j}|.
The strongly connected nature of the network ensures that
there is always an information path (k → j) from every other
agent k ∈ K to every agent j ∈ K. We denote the associated
delay simply by d{k,j} and, by convention, we set d{k,k} = 0.
Because the links in the network are directed the delay d{k,j}
in communication from k to j is not necessarily the same as
the delay d{j,k} in communication from j to k.
C. System Description
The network of agents is considered a discrete time system
that evolves up to a finite time horizon T ∈ N. At time t =
0, 1, · · · , T , the state of the system Xt takes values in a finite
set Xt and the control variable Ukt associated with agent k ∈
K, takes values in a finite set Ukt . Let U1:Kt denote the vector
(U1t , · · · , UKt ). Starting at the initial state X0, the evolution
of the system follows the state equation
Xt+1 = ft
(
Xt, U
1:K
t ,Wt
)
, (2)
where Wt is the uncontrolled disturbance to the system rep-
resented as a random variable taking values in a finite set W .
At time t every agent k makes an observation Y kt ,
Y kt = h
k
t (Xt, V
k
t ), (3)
taking values in a finite set Yk through a noisy sensor, where
V kt takes values in the finite set Vk and represents the noise
in measurement.
4Agent k selects a control action Ukt from the set of feasible
control actions Ukt as a function of its information structure.
The information structure is different for each agent k ∈ K
because of the means of communication and topology of the
network. We discuss the information structure in Section II-E.
After each agent k generates a control action Ukt , the system
incurs a cost ct(Xt, U1t , · · · , UKt ) ∈ R.
D. Assumptions
In our modeling framework above, we impose the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1. The network topology is arbitrary, known
apriori, and does not change with time.
With a known and invariable network topology, every agent
can keep track of what information is accessible to other agents
in the network.
Assumption 2. The external disturbance {Wt : t = 0, · · · , T}
and the noise in measurement {V kt : t = 0, · · · , T ; k =
1, · · · ,K} are sequences of independent random variables that
are also independent of each other and of the initial state X0.
The external disturbance, noise in measurement, and initial
state are referred to as the primitive random variables, and
they have known probability distributions.
Assumption 3. The state functions (ft : t = 0, · · · , T ),
observation functions (hkt : t = 0, · · · , T ; k = 1, · · · ,K), the
cost functions (ct : t = 0, · · · , T ), and the set of all feasible
control policies G are known to all agents.
These functions and the set of feasible control policies
(defined in Section II-E) form the basis of the decision making
problem.
Assumption 4. Each agent has perfect recall.
Perfect recall of the data from the memory of every agent
is an essential assumption for the structural results derived in
this paper.
Fig. 1: Sequence of activities.
We summarize below the sequence of activities taken by
agent k ∈ K at time t (Fig. 1):
1) The state Xt is updated based on (2).
2) Agent k receives information from all agents in K
denoted by Ikt .
3) Agent k makes an observation about the state Y kt based
on (3).
4) Agent k updates its memory, Mkt , defined in the next
section, on a given protocol.
5) Agent k transmits information, I
k
t , to every agent j ∈ K,
which is directly connected with k.
6) Agent k generates a control action Ukt .
E. Information Structure of the System
The information structure of the system is characterized by
the graph topology and delays along communication paths
described in Section I-B. In the word-of-mouth information
structure, every agent j ∈ K at time t transmits the information
I
j
t := {Y jt , U jt−1} to every other agent in the network through
the relevant information paths. Agent k ∈ K receives informa-
tion I
j
t at time t+ d
{j,k}, where d{j,k} is the communication
delay from j to k. Then, the information available to agent
k at time t is the collection of information he received from
every agent j ∈ K at time steps 0 through t.
Definition 4. The memory of agent k ∈ K is defined as the
random variable Mkt that takes values in the finite set Mkt
and is given by
Mkt :=
{
Y j
0:t−d{j,k} , U
j
0:t−d{j,k}−1 : j ∈ K
}
, (4)
where d{j,k} is the delay in information transfer from every
agent j ∈ K to agent k.
At time t, agent k accesses his memory Mkt to generate a
control action, namely,
Ukt := g
k
t (M
k
t ), (5)
where gkt is the control policy of agent k at time t. We define
the control policy for each agent as gk := (gk0 , · · · , gkT ) and
the strategy of the system as g := (g1, · · · , gK). The set of
all feasible control policies is denoted by G.
The performance criterion for the system is given by the
total expected cost:
Problem 1: J (g) = Eg
[
T∑
t=0
ct(Xt, U
1
t , · · · , UKt )
]
, (6)
where the expectation is with respect to the joint probability
measure on the random variables Xt, U1t , · · · , UKt .
The optimization problem is to select the optimal strat-
egy g∗ ∈ G that minimizes the performance criterion
in (6), given the probability distributions of the primitive
random variables {X0,W0:T , V 10:T , · · · , V K0:T }, and functions{
ct, ft, h
1:K
t : t = 0, · · · , T
}
.
III. THE PRECRIPTION APPROACH
In this section, we present the prescription approach to
deriving sufficient statistics for our model. After establishing
the information structure in Section II-E, the prescription
approach is described using only the memory Mkt of every
agent k ∈ K.
5A. Permutations of the Agents
The first step in our analysis is the construction of K
permutations (or orders) of agents in set K.
Definition 5. The permutation corresponding to agent k ∈ K
is defined as a K-tuple ordered list ok = (ok,1, · · · , ok,K) with
ok,1 = k.
In a permutation ok, the first component ok,1 always refers
to agent k. Let P := {1, · · · ,K} be the set of possible
positions in a permutation. Then, the agent located at position
p ∈ P in the permutation ok is denoted by the component ok,p.
As an example, consider a system with three agents that has
a permutation given by o3 = (3, 1, 2). In this permutation, we
say that agent 1 is located at position 2, denoted by o3,2 = 1.
Remark 1. We use the indices i, j, and k to refer to agents
in K, while we use the indices p, r, and q to refer to the
positions the occupied by the agents in a given permutation
ok = (ok,1, · · · , ok,K).
Remark 2. When agent k ∈ K occupies position p ∈ P in
permutation oi, we write any random variable corresponding
to k, i.e., Ukt , X
k
t , equivalently as U
[p]
t , X
[p]
t . When agent
j ∈ K also occupies position r ∈ P in permutation oi, we
write any variable of the form d{k,j} equivalently as d[p,r].
We also define the set of agents located at positions beyond
p in a permutation ok of k ∈ K.
Definition 6. For a position p in permutation ok, the set of
positions beyond p is given by B[p] := {r ∈ P : r ≥ p}.
To systematically construct permutation ok corresponding to
an agent k ∈ K, we select each agent in K to occupy positions
p ∈ P \ {1} satisfying the following property∣∣∣( p−1⋂
q=1
M
[q]
t
)
∩M [p]t
∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣( p−1⋂
q=1
M
[q]
t
)
∩M [r]t
∣∣∣,
∀r ∈ B[p], ∀p ∈ P \ {1}, (7)
where M [1]t = M
k
t corresponds to the memory of agent k
that occupies position 1 in permutation ok. For example, the
agent located at position 2 in permutation ok must satisfy the
property
|M [1]t ∩M [2]t | ≥ |M [1]t ∩M [r]t |, ∀r ∈ {2, · · · ,K}. (8)
For the agent located at position p = 3 we have
|M [1]t ∩M [2]t ∩M [3]t | ≥ |M [1]t ∩M [2]t ∩M [r]t |,
∀r ∈ {3, · · · ,K}. (9)
We consider, without loss of generality, that the trivial permu-
tation given by o1 = (1, 2, · · · ,K) satisfies (7).
To this end, we select permutation o1 ∈ O as the default
permutation to derive the results in the subsequent sections.
B. Construction of Prescriptions
For an agent k ∈ K at position p ∈ P in a permutation o1,
we consider a scenario where the control action Ukt = U
[p]
t(
gkt (M
k
t ) = g
[p]
t (M
[p]
t )
)
is generated in two stages:
(1) Agent k, located at position p in permutation o1,
generates a function based on information which is a subset
of the information available in its memory M [p]t .
(2) This function takes as an input the compliment of the
subset used to generate it, and yields the control action U [p]t .
We call these functions prescriptions. They allow us to
construct an optimization problem of selecting the optimal
prescription strategy that is equivalent to the problem of
selecting the optimal strategy g∗k as we show next. In this
section, we construct the subset of the memory M [p]t and
prescriptions for agents at every position p in permutation o1
without changing the information structure of the system.
Definition 7. Let k ∈ K be at position p in permutation o1,
and M [p]t be the agent’s memory at time t. The accessible
information of the agent located at p is defined as the set A[p]t
that takes values in the finite collection of sets A[p]t such that
A
[p]
t =
p⋂
q=1
(
M
[q]
t
)
. (10)
For example, in a permutation o1 = (1, · · · ,K) we can
write (10) for the agent located at position p = 1 as
A
[1]
t = M
[1]
t , (11)
and for the agent located at position p = 2 as
A
[2]
t = M
[1]
t ∩M [2]t . (12)
Based on Definition 7, the accessible information A[p]t has
the following properties:
A
[p]
t−1 ⊂ A[p]t , (13)
A
[r]
t ⊂ A[p]t , ∀r ∈ B[p], (14)
where B[p] is the set of positions beyond p (Definition 6).
Property (13) motivates the introduction of a new term to
denote the new information added to accessible information
A
[p]
t at time t.
Definition 8. The new information for agent k at position p
in permutation o1 at time t is defined as the set Z
[p]
t that takes
values in a finite collection of sets Z [p]t such that
Z
[p]
t := A
[p]
t \A[p]t−1. (15)
We observe in (14) that the accessible information A[r]t of
an agent located at any position r ∈ B[p] is a subset of the
memory M [p]t of the agent located at position p in permutation
o1. Thus, we can define the inaccessible information of the
agent located at p with respect to the accessible information
A
[r]
t for every r ∈ B[p].
Definition 9. The inaccessible information of an agent located
at position p in permutation o1 with respect to accessible
information A[r]t , r ∈ B[p], is defined as the set of random
variables L[p,r]t that takes values in the finite collection of sets
L[p,r]t such that
L
[p,r]
t := M
[p]
t \A[r]t . (16)
6Note that the inaccessible information of an agent located at
p with respect to its own accessible information A[p]t is given
by
L
[p,p]
t := M
[p]
t \A[p]t . (17)
The pair of sets A[r]t and L
[p,r]
t forms a partition of the set
M
[p]
t , such that
M
[p]
t = {L[p,r]t , A[r]t }, ∀r ∈ B[p]. (18)
As an example, consider a system with three agents Fig.
2. The trivial permutation is given by o1 = (1, 2, 3), where
M
[p]
t = M
p
t for all p ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In this system, we have
A
[1]
t = M
[1]
t ,
A
[3]
t ⊂ A[2]t ⊂M [1]t ,
M
[1]
t = {A[2]t , L[1,2]t } = {A[3]t , L[1,3]t }. (19)
For agent 2 located at position p = 2, and agent 3 located
at position p = 3, we can derive similar relationships as
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Memory partitions of three agents in
the trivial permutation.
Next, we use these partitions of the memory to define the
prescription function.
Definition 10. The prescription function Γ[p,r]t of an agent
located at position p in permutation o1 for the agent located
at position r ∈ P is defined as follows
Γ
[p,r]
t :
{
L[r,p]t 7−→ U [r]t , if r 6∈ B[p],
L[r,r]t 7−→ U [r]t , if r ∈ B[p],
(20)
and takes values in the set of feasible prescription functions
G
[p,r]
t .
Remark 3. In Definition 9, the inaccessible information of
an agent k located at position p is defined with respect to the
accessible information A[r]t for r ∈ B[p]. Note that in the first
part of (20), we have p ∈ B[r].
The prescription function of an agent located at a position
p in permutation o1 for itself at time t is given by Γ
[p,p]
t :
L[p,p]t 7−→ U [p]t . Every prescription function Γ[p,r] is generated
as follows
Γ
[p,r]
t :=
{
ψ
[p,r]
t (A
[p]
t ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
[p,r]
t (A
[r]
t ), if r ∈ B[p],
(21)
where we call ψ[p,r]t the prescription strategy of the agent
located at position p for the agent located at position r given
by the mapping
ψ
[p,r]
t :
{
A[p]t 7−→ G [p,r]t , if r 6∈ B[p],
A[r]t 7−→ G [p,r]t , if r ∈ B[p].
(22)
We call ψ[p] := (ψ[p,1], · · · ,ψ[p,K]) the prescription strat-
egy of the agent located at p. The set of feasible prescription
strategies for the agent located at p is denoted by Ψ[p].
Remark 4. The prescription Γ[p,r]t of agent k, located at
position p, for agent j, located at position r, in permutation
o1 is only available to agent k. The equivalent prescription
available to agent j is Γ[r,r]t . The relationship between the
two is given in Lemmas 3 and 4.
Remark 5. Every agent needs to generate prescriptions corre-
sponding to every other agent in the system in order to utilize
the structural result presented in this paper. This is highlighted
in section III-D when we define the information state.
Next, we define the complete prescription of an agent
located at p below.
Definition 11. The complete prescription for an agent located
at position p in permutation o1 is given by the function
Θ
[p]
t : L[1,p]t × · · · × L[p,p]t × L[p+1,p+1]t × · · · × L[K,K]t
7−→ U [1]t × · · · × U [K]t , (23)
which takes values in the set of functions G [p]t .
The complete prescription for an agent located at position p
in permutation o1 is constructed as Θ
[p]
t = (Γ
[p,1]
t , · · · ,Γ[p,K]t ).
C. Relationships Between Prescriptions and Control Policies
In this section we present the relationships between pre-
scriptions in different permutations and different control poli-
cies. The first result states that for an agent k at position p in
permutation o1, we can use the complete prescription Θ
[p]
t to
generate control action Ukt instead of the strategy g
k
t .
Lemma 1. Let agent k ∈ K be located at position p ∈ P in
permutation o1 and let Θ
[p]
t be its complete prescription. For
any given strategy g ∈ G, there exists a prescription strategy
ψ[p] ∈ Ψ[p] such that
U
[p]
t = Γ
[p,p]
t
(
L
[p,p]
t
)
. (24)
Proof. Let A[p]t and L
[p,p]
t be the accessible and inaccessible
information respectively of agent k at position p in o1. For
7any strategy g that generates Ukt from (5), we can select a
prescription strategy ψ[p]t : A[p]t 7−→ G [p,p]t such that
Γ
[p,p]
t (·) = ψ[p]t (A[p]t ) = g[p,p]t (A[p]t , ·). (25)
Then, the control action U [p]t = U
k
t is
U
[p]
t =Γ
[p,p]
t (L
[p,p]
t )
=g
[p]
t (A
[p]
t , L
[p,p]
t ) = g
[p]
t (M
[p]
t ) = g
k
t (M
k
t ). (26)
Similarly, for any prescription strategy ψ[p], we can con-
struct an appropriate strategy g that generates the same control
actions U [p]t for agents at all positions p = 1, · · · ,K, as we
show next.
Lemma 2. Let agent k ∈ K be located at position p in
permutation o1, and let Θ
[p]
t be its complete prescription. For
any given prescription strategy ψ[p] ∈ Ψ[p], there exists a
strategy g ∈ G such that
U
[p]
t = Γ
[p,p]
t
(
L
[p,p]
t
)
= g
[p]
t (M
[p]
t ). (27)
Proof. For any prescription strategy ψ[p], we can construct the
a control policy g[p] such that
U
[p]
t = g
[p]
t (M
[p]
t )
= g
[p]
t (A
[p]
t , L
[p,p]
t ) = ψ
[p,p]
t (A
[p]
t )(L
[p,p]
t ). (28)
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that every control action U [p]t of an
agent located at p generated through a prescription strategy
ψ[p], can also be generated through an appropriate strategy g
and vice versa.
Definition 12. Let two agents k, j ∈ K be located at positions
p, r ∈ P respectively in a permutation o1. A positional
relationship from position p to position r is given by the
function
e[r,p] : Ψ[p] 7−→ Ψ[r]. (29)
Next we show the existence of a positional relationship
e[r,p] from any position p to any position r in permutation
o1 with desirable properties that allow us to construct optimal
control policies of all agents in K from the optimal prescription
strategy of just one agent, located at any position in o1. The
following result establishes that using a positional relationship
e[r,p] = (e
[r,p]
1 , · · · , e[r,p]T ), an agent located at the position r
can derive the prescription strategy of an agent located at the
position q, using the prescription strategy of the agent at p
with respect to the agent at q, namely
ψ
[r,q]
t := e
[r,p]
t
(
ψ
[p,q]
t
)
, ∀q ∈ P. (30)
Lemma 3. Let k, j ∈ K be two agents at positions p and r
respectively in permutation o1 with r ∈ B[p]. For any given
prescription strategy ψ[p] for the agent located at p, there
exists a positional relationship e[r,p] such that a prescription
strategy ψ[r] of the agent located at r generated from (30)
yields:
1. Γ[p,q]t (L
[q,q]
t ) = Γ
[r,q]
t (L
[q,q]
t ), if q ∈ B[r],
2. Γ[p,q]t (L
[q,q]
t ) = Γ
[r,q]
t (L
[q,r]
t ), if q ∈ B[p], q 6∈ B[r],
3. Γ[p,q]t (L
[q,p]
t ) = Γ
[r,q]
t (L
[q,r]
t ), if q 6∈ B[p]. (31)
Proof. Let i ∈ K be an agent located at a position q ∈ P and
g
[q]
t denote the control policy of agent i at time t. To prove
the result, we construct g[q]t and the prescription strategy ψ
[r]
t
for three cases, given a prescription strategy ψ[p].
1) If q ∈ B[r], the control policy g[q]t can be constructed
from the prescription strategy ψ[p,q]t , namely,
g
[q]
t (A
[q]
t , L
[q,q]
t ) = ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ). (32)
From (21) we have
Γ
[r,q]
t = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[q]
t ), ∀q ∈ B[r], (33)
and thus,
ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ) = g
[q]
t (A
[q]
t , L
[q,q]
t ). (34)
Hence
ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ) = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ). (35)
2) If q ∈ B[p] and q 6∈ B[r], the control policy g[q]t can be
constructed by the prescription strategy ψ[p,q]t , namely,
g
[q]
t (A
[q]
t , L
[q,q]
t ) = ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ). (36)
q ∈ B[p] and r ∈ B[p] implies q 6∈ B[r]. From (21) we
have
Γ
[r,q]
t = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[r]
t ), ∀q 6∈ B[r]. (37)
Thus,
ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[r]
t )(L
[q,r]
t ) = g
[q]
t (A
[r]
t , L
[q,r]
t )
= g
[q]
t (A
[q]
t , L
[q,q]
t ). (38)
Hence
ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ) = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[r]
t )(L
[q,r]
t ). (39)
3) If q 6∈ B[p], the control policy g[q]t can be constructed by
the prescription strategy ψ[p,q]t , namely,
g
[q]
t (A
[p]
t , L
[q,p]
t ) = ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[p]
t )(L
[q,p]
t ). (40)
From (21) we have
Γ
[r,q]
t = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[r]
t ), ∀q 6∈ B[r]. (41)
Thus,
ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[r]
t )(L
[q,r]
t ) = g
[q]
t (A
[r]
t , L
[q,r]
t )
= g
[q]
t (A
[p]
t , L
[q,p]
t ). (42)
Hence,
ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[p]
t )(L
[q,p]
t ) = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[r]
t )(L
[q,r]
t ). (43)
To complete the proof, note that we can define a po-
sitional relationship e[r,p] : Ψ[p] 7→ Ψ[r] with e[r,p] =
8(e
[r,p]
1 , · · · , e[r,p]T ) such that (30) implies (35), (39) and (43)
with r ∈ B[p].
Lemma 4. Let k, j ∈ K be two agents at positions p and r
respectively in permutation o1 with r 6∈ B[p]. For any given
prescription strategy ψ[p] of the agent located at p, there exists
a positional relationship e[r,p] such that a prescription strategy
ψ[r] of the agent located at r generated from (30) yields:
1. Γ[p,q]t (L
[q,q]
t ) = Γ
[r,q]
t (L
[q,q]
t ), if q ∈ B[p],
2. Γ[p,q]t (L
[q,p]
t ) = Γ
[r,q]
t (L
[q,q]
t ), if q ∈ B[r], q 6∈ B[p],
3. Γ[p,q]t (L
[q,p]
t ) = Γ
[r,q]
t (L
[q,r]
t ), if q 6∈ B[r]. (44)
Proof. Let i ∈ K be an agent located at a position q ∈ P and
g
[q]
t denote the control policy of agent i at time t. To prove
the result, we construct g[q]t and the prescription strategy ψ
[r]
t
for three cases, given a prescription strategy ψ[p].
1) If q ∈ B[p], the control policy g[q]t can be constructed by
the prescription strategy ψ[p,q]t , namely
g
[q]
t (A
[q]
t , L
[q,q]
t ) = ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ). (45)
q ∈ B[p] and r 6∈ B[p] implies q ∈ B[r].
From (21), we have
Γ
[r,q]
t = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[p]
t ), ∀q ∈ B[r]. (46)
Thus,
ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ) = g
[q]
t (A
[q]
t , L
[q,q]
t ). (47)
Hence,
ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ) = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ). (48)
2) If q ∈ B[r], q 6∈ B[p], the control policy g[q]t can be
constructed by the prescription strategy ψ[p,q]t , namely
g
[q]
t (A
[p]
t , L
[q,p]
t ) = ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[p]
t )(L
[q,p]
t ). (49)
From (21), we have
Γ
[r,q]
t = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[q]
t ), ∀q ∈ B[r]. (50)
Thus,
ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ) = g
[q]
t (A
[q]
t , L
[q,q]
t )
= g
[q]
t (A
[p]
t , L
[q,p]
t ). (51)
Hence,
ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[q]
t )(L
[q,q]
t ) = ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[p]
t )(L
[q,p]
t ). (52)
3) If q 6∈ B[p], the control policy g[q]t can be constructed by
the prescription strategy ψ[p,q]t , namely
g
[q]
t (A
[p]
t , L
[q,p]
t ) = ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[p]
t )(L
[q,p]
t ). (53)
From (21) we have
Γ
[r,q]
t = ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[r]
t ), ∀q 6∈ B[r]. (54)
Thus,
ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[r]
t )(L
[q,r]
t ) = g
[q]
t (A
[r]
t , L
[q,r]
t )
= g
[q]
t (A
[p]
t , L
[q,p]
t ). (55)
Hence,
ψ
[r,q]
t (A
[r]
t )(L
[q,r]
t ) = ψ
[p,q]
t (A
[p]
t )(L
[q,p]
t ). (56)
To complete the proof, note that we can define a po-
sitional relationship e[r,p] : Ψ[p] 7→ Ψ[r] with e[r,p] =
(e
[r,p]
1 , · · · , e[r,p]T ) such that (30) implies (48), (52) and (56)
when r 6∈ B[p].
To this end, we use a relationship function e[r,p] from every
position p ∈ P to every position r ∈ P in a permutation o1
which satisfies the properties in Lemmas 3 and 4. This implies
that for any two agents located at p and r in permutation o1,
we have the relation,
U
[r]
t = Γ
[r,r]
t (L
[r,r]
t ) =
{
Γ
[p,r]
t (L
[r,p]
t ), if r 6∈ B[p],
Γ
[p,r]
t (L
[r,r]
t ), if r ∈ B[p].
(57)
Next, we relate the prescription strategies of an agent k that
are defined with respect to two different permutations om, on ∈
O. We let agent k be located at position p in permutation om
and at position p′ in permutation on. Before we proceed, we
define a function that maps the set of feasible prescription
strategies Ψ[p] of agent k in permutation om with the set of
feasible prescription strategies Ψ[p
′] of agent k in permutation
on.
Definition 13. Let agent k ∈ K be located at position
p ∈ P in permutation om ∈ O and at position p′ ∈ P in
permutation on ∈ O. A permutation relationship for agent k
from permutation om to permutation on is given by a function
[p
′,p] : Ψ[p] 7−→ Ψ[p′]. (58)
The following result proves the existence of a permutation
relationship [p,p
′] = (
[p,p′]
1 , · · · , [p,p
′]
T ), where
ψ
[p′,r′]
t = 
[p′,p]
t
(
ψ
[p,r]
t
)
,∀r, r′ ∈ P, (59)
and r and r′ are the positions of another agent j ∈ K in
permutations om and on respectively.
Lemma 5. Let om, on ∈ O be two permutations of the set K
such that two agents k, j ∈ K are located at p, r ∈ P in om
and at p′, r′ ∈ P in on respectively. For a given prescription
strategy ψ[p,r]t of agent k for agent j in permutation om, there
exists a permutation relationship [p
′,p]
t such that the prescrip-
tion strategy ψ[p
′,r′]
t of agent k for agent j in permutation on
constructed using (59) satisfies the property,
U jt =
{
Γ
[p′,r′]
t (L
[r′,p′]), if r′ 6∈ B[p′],
Γ
[p′,r′]
t (L
[r′,r′]), if r′ ∈ B[p′]. (60)
Proof. Let A[p]t and A
[p′]
t be the accessible information for
agent k at time t with respect to permutations om and on
respectively. From (57), the control policy gjt for agent j
located at r in permutation om is
U jt = g
j
t (M
j
t ) =
{
ψ
[p,r]
t (A
[p]
t )(L
[r,p]
t ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
[p,r]
t (A
[r]
t )(L
[r,r]
t ), if r ∈ B[p].
(61)
The same agent j is located at r′ in permutation on. We can
construct a prescription strategy ψ[p
′,r′]
t of agent k located at
9p′ in permutation on for j located at r′ in permutation on,
namely,
U jt = ψ
[p′,r′]
t (A
[p′]
t )(L
[r′,p′]
t ) = g
j
t (M
j
t ), if r
′ 6∈ B[p′], (62)
or
U jt = ψ
[p′,r′]
t (A
[r′]
t )(L
[r′,r′]
t ) = g
j
t (M
j
t ), if r
′ ∈ B[p′]. (63)
To complete the proof, note that given a prescription strategy
ψ
[p,r]
t for permutation on, we can construct a prescription
strategy ψ[p
′,r′]
t using (61), (62) and (63) that implies (60).
Thus, there exists a permutation relationship [p
′,p] : Ψ[p] 7→
Ψ[p
′] with [p,p
′] = (
[p,p′]
1 , · · · , [p,p
′]
T ) such that (59) implies
(60).
Lemma 5 establishes that all permutations are equivalent
for the purpose of deriving prescription strategies. This also
justifies our selection of permutation o1 ∈ O in deriving the
results. We revisit the idea behind multiple permutations in
Section IV-E.
Fig. 3: A summary of the relationships established
in Section III-C.
The relationships established in this section are summarized
in Fig. 3 with two agents k, j ∈ K located at p, r ∈ P
in permutation om and located at p′, r′ ∈ P in a second
permutation on respectively.
D. The Prescription Problem
In permutation o1 ∈ O, Lemmas 1 through 4 lead to (57).
This implies that the control action U jt = U
[r]
t for an agent
j ∈ K located at position r ∈ P in permutation o1 can be
equivalently obtained through the prescription function Γ[p,r]t
of an agent located at any other position p ∈ P in permutation
o1, if the corresponding inaccessible information were made
available.
Thus, using (57), we can write the cost incurred by the
system at time t in with respect to permutation o1 as
ct(Xt, U
1
t , · · · ,UKt )
=: cot
(
Xt,Γ
[p,1]
t (L
[1,p]
t ), · · · ,Γ[p,p]t (L[p,p]t ),
Γ
[p,p+1]
t (L
[p+1,p+1]
t ), · · · ,Γ[p,K]t (L[K,K]t )
)
,
(64)
where the inputs U1t , · · · , UKt of the function cot (·) are taken
in the order of the permutation o1.
We can then reformulate Problem 1 in terms of the pre-
scription strategy of an agent located at p in permutation o1.
The optimization problem is to select the optimal prescription
strategy ψ∗[p] ∈ Ψ[p] that minimizes the performance criterion
given by the total expected cost:
Problem 2: J [p](ψ[p]) =
Eψ
[p]
[ T∑
t=0
cot
(
Xt,Γ
[p,1]
t (L
[1,p]
t ), · · · ,Γ[p,p]t (L[p,p]t ),
Γ
[p,p+1]
t (L
[p+1,p+1]
t ), · · · ,Γ[p,K]t (L[K,K]t )
)]
. (65)
The task of deriving optimal prescription strategy ψ∗[p],
and subsequently, the complete prescription Θ[p]t for the agent
located at p in permutation o1 is assigned to a fictitious
designer that can only access memory M [p]t . Note that this
maintains the decentralized nature of the problem as the
strategies are implemented by the agents in real time with
asymmetric information. The next result shows that Problem
2 for position p is equivalent to Problem 1.
Lemma 6. For any position p ∈ P in permutation o1, Problem
2 is equivalent to Problem 1.
Proof. Eq. (64) implies that the performance criterion
J [p](ψ[p]) in (65) is equal to the performance criterion J (g)
in (6). Thus, given the optimal prescription strategy ψ∗[p],
from Lemmas 1 and 2, we can derive the optimal policy g∗
in Problem 1.
Next, we present a state sufficient for input-output mapping
in Problem 2 for position p following the exposition presented
in [35].
Lemma 7. A state sufficient for input-output mapping for an
agent located at a position p in permutation o1 is
S
[p]
t :=
{
Xt, L
[1,p]
t , · · · , L[p−1,p]t , L[p,p]t , · · · , L[K,K]t
}
. (66)
Proof. The state S[p]t satisfies the three properties stated by
Witsenhausen [36]:
1) There exist functions fˆ [p]t , t = 0, · · · , T such that
S
[p]
t+1 = fˆ
[p]
t (S
[p]
t ,Wt, V
[1]
t+1, · · · , V [K]t+1 ,Θ[p]t ). (67)
2) There exist functions hˆ[p]t , t = 0, · · · , T such that
Z
[p]
t+1 = hˆ
[p]
t (S
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
t , V
[1]
t+1, · · · , V [K]t+1 ). (68)
3) There exist functions cˆ[p]t , t = 0, · · · , T such that
cot (Xt, U
[1]
t , · · · , U [K]t ) = cˆ[p]t (S[p]t ,Θ[p]t ). (69)
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The three equations above can each be verified by substitution
of variables on the LHS to bring them in a form that is a
function of the variables of the RHS as summarized below.
1) We have that Skt+1 = {Xt+1, L[1,p]t+1 , · · · , L[p,p]t+1 , · · · ,
L
[K,K]
t+1 }. We analyze each term here individually. First, for
Xt+1 we have the following relation,
Xt+1 = ft
(
Xt, U
[1]
t , · · · , U [K]t
)
= ft
(
Xt,Γ
[p,1]
t (L
[1,p]
t ),
· · · ,Γ[p,p]t (L[p,p]t ), · · · .,Γ[p,K]t (L[K,K]t )
)
. (70)
We know that the new information added to the memory
M
[p]
t is a subset of all previously inaccessible information
{L[1,p]t , · · · , L[p,p]t , · · · , L[K,K]t } and the most recent control
actions and observations {Y [1]t+1, U [1]t , · · · , Y [K]t+1 , U [K]t }. For
L
[r,p]
t+1 for any r ∈ P this gives us
L
[r,p]
t+1 ⊂
(
L
[r,p]
t \ Z [p]t+1
)
∪ {L[1,p]t , · · · , L[p,p]t , · · · , L[K,K]t }
∪ {Y [1]t+1, U [1]t , · · · , Y [K]t+1 , U [K]t }, (71)
which can be simplified as follows,
L
[r,p]
t+1 ⊂{L[1,p]t , · · · , L[p,p]t , · · · , L[K,K]t }
∪ {Y [1]t+1, U [1]t , · · · , Y [K]t+1 , U [K]t }. (72)
We can further simplify the final term in (72) as follows,
{Y [1]t+1,U [1]t , · · · , Y [K]t+1 , U [K]t }
⊂
{
h
[1]
t+1(Xt+1, V
[1]
t+1), · · · , h[K]t+1(Xt+1, V [K]t+1 ),
Γ
[p,1]
t (L
[1,p]
t ), · · · ,Γ[p,p]t (L[p,p]t ), · · · .,Γ[p,K]t (L[K,K]t )
}
.
(73)
This completes the proof of (67).
2) For Z [p]t+1, we have the relation,
Z
[p]
t+1 ⊂{L[1,p]t , · · · , L[p,p]t , · · · , L[K,K]t }
∪ {Y [1]t+1, U [1]t , · · · , Y [K]t+1 , U [K]t }. (74)
The proof of (67) is completed through a procedure similar to
the one in part 1.
3) We have already shown in part 1 that U [r]t can be written
as a function of S[p]t and Θ
[p]
t for any positions two p and r
in permutation o1. This completes the proof of (69).
We also establish a relationship between the states sufficient
for input-output mapping S[p]t of an agent located at the
position p ∈ P and S[r]t of an agent located at the position
r ∈ B[p] in permutation o1 below.
Lemma 8. Let S[p]t be the state sufficient for input-output
mapping of the agent located at the position p ∈ P in permu-
tation o1. The state sufficient for input-output mapping S
[r]
t of
the agent located at the position r ∈ B[p] in permutation o1
satisfies the following property,
S
[r]
t =
{
S
[p]
t , A
[p]
t \A[r]t
}
. (75)
Proof. From Lemma 7, the state sufficient for input-output
mapping for any agent located at the position r ∈ P is
S
[r]
1 =
{
Xt, L
[1,r]
t , · · · , L[r−1,r]t , L[r,r]t , .., L[K,K]t
}
. (76)
For any r ∈ B[p] and q 6∈ B[r], we have the following
properties for the inaccessible information L[q,r]t
1. L[q,r]t = L
[q,p]
t ∪
(
A
[p]
t \A[r]t
)
, ∀q 6∈ B[p],
2. L[q,r]t = L
[q,q]
t ∪
(
A
[q]
t \A[r]t
)
, ∀q ∈ B[p], q 6∈ B[r]. (77)
Substituting (77) in (75), we have
S
[r]
t =
{
Xt, L
[1,p]
t , A
[p]
t \A[r]t , · · · , L[p,p]t , A[p]t \A[r]t ,
· · · , L[r−1,r−1]t , A[r−1]t \A[r]t , L[r,r]t , · · · , L[K,K]t
}
=
{
S
[p]
t , A
[p]
t \A[r]t , A[p+1]t \A[r]t , · · · , A[r−1]t \A[r]t
}
.
(78)
From (14)
A
[K]
t ⊂ A[K−1]t ⊂ · · · ⊂ A[p]t . (79)
Using (79) in (78) implies
S
[r]
1 =
{
S
[p]
1 , A
[p]
t \A[r]t
}
. (80)
From the designer’s point of view, the system behaves
like a Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP)
with state S[p]t , control input Θ
[p]
t , output Z
[p]
t and cost
cˆ
[p]
t (S
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
t ) at time t. The history of outputs up to time
t is given by Z [p]0:t = A
[p]
t . The big deviation is because
the prescription functions Γ[p,r]t , r ∈ B[p], are generated
as functions of the accessible information A[r]t instead of
A
[p]
t . Thus, structural results for POMDP problems cannot be
directly applied to Problem 2. Before proceeding to structural
results, we define the information state for an agent located at
position p in permutation o1.
Definition 14. Let S[p]t be the state, A
[p]
t the accessible infor-
mation, and Θ[p]0:t−1 the control inputs at time t for an agent
located at a position p in permutation o1. The information state
is defined as a probability distribution Π[p]t that takes values
in the possible realizations P [p]t := ∆(S [p]t ) such that,
Π
[p]
t (s
[p]
t ) := Pψ
[p]
(S
[p]
t = s
[p]
t
∣∣A[p]t ,Θ[p]0:t−1). (81)
IV. STRUCTURAL RESULTS
A. Properties of the Information States
In this section we present standard results establishing
properties of the information state Π[p]t for an agent located
at any position p ∈ P . The first property establishes that the
information state Π[p]t is independent from the prescription
strategy ψ[p].
Lemma 9. At time t, there exists a function F [p]t independent
from the prescription strategy ψ[p] such that
Π
[p]
t+1 = F
[p]
t+1(Π
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
t , Z
[p]
t+1). (82)
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Proof. See Appendix A for the proof.
The second property of the information state Π[p]t is that its
evolution is Markovian as it is shown next.
Lemma 10. The evolution of the information state Πt is a
controlled Markov Chain with Θ[p]t as the control action at
time t
P(Π[p]t+1|A[p]t ,Π[p]0:t,Θ[p]0:t) = P(Π[p]t+1|Π[p]t ,Θ[p]t ). (83)
Proof. See Appendix B for the proof.
The third property of the information state Π[p]t is that the
expected cost incurred by the system at time t can be written
as a function of Π[p]t .
Lemma 11. There exists a function C [p]t , independent of the
prescription strategy ψ[p], such that
Eψ
[p][
cˆ
[p]
t (S
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
t )|A[p]t ,Θ[p]0:t
]
= C
[p]
t (Π
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
t ). (84)
Proof. See Appendix B for the proof.
In Lemmas 9 through 11, we established that the infor-
mation state Π[p]t evolves as a controlled Markov chain with
control inputs Θ[p]t .
B. Structural Results
We start by presenting a structural result for an agent located
at position K in permutation o1. By definition, the set of
positions beyond K is empty, i.e., B[K] = ∅. Using (21), this
implies that for all positions p ∈ P in permutation o1, the
prescription component Γ[K,p]t is a function of the accessible
information A[K]t . This leads to the following result derived
in [26] through the common information approach.
Lemma 12. Consider the agent located at position K. There
exists an optimal prescription strategy ψ∗[K] of the form
Γ
∗[K,p]
t = ψ
∗[K,p]
t (Π
[K]
t ), (85)
that optimizes the performance criterion (65) in Problem 2.
For any position p ∈ P in permutation o1, we know that for
two agents located at positions p and r ∈ B[p], we have A[r]t ⊂
A
[p]
t . Given the accessible information A
[p]
t and the optimal
prescription strategy ψ∗[p], the agent located at p can derive
the optimal complete prescriptions Θ∗[r]t for every r ∈ B[p].
This property forms the basis of the structural result presented
in this paper.
Before we prove the main structural result of the paper, we
first prove the result for a two-stage system and a three-stage
system respectively. This steps of the proof for the structural
result is inspired by [12], [37].
Lemma 13. (Two-Stage Lemma) Consider an agent located
at the position p of permutation o1 in a system with the time
horizon T = 1. There exists an optimal prescription strategy
ψ
∗[p]
1 of the form
Γ
∗[p,r]
1 =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[p]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[r]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r ∈ B[p],
(86)
that optimizes the performance criterion (65) in Problem 2.
Proof. See Appendix C for the proof.
Lemma 14. (Three-Stage Lemma) Consider an agent lo-
cated at the position p of permutation o1 in a system with
the time horizon T = 2. Given that the optimal prescription
strategy ψ∗[p]2 has the form
Γ
∗[p,r]
2 =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
2 (Π
[p]
2 , · · · ,Π[K]2 ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
2 (Π
[r]
2 , · · · ,Π[K]2 ), if r ∈ B[p],
(87)
there exists an optimal prescription strategy ψ∗[p]1 of the form
Γ
∗[p,r]
1 =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[p]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[r]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r ∈ B[p],
(88)
that optimizes the performance criterion (65) in Problem 2.
Proof. See Appendix D for the proof.
This leads us to the following structural result for the
optimal prescription strategy ψ∗[p].
Theorem 1. Consider an agent located at the position p of
permutation o1. There exists an optimal prescription strategy
ψ∗[p] of the form
Γ
∗[p,r]
t (·) =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
t (Π
[p]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
t (Π
[r]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t ), if r ∈ B[p],
(89)
that optimizes the performance criterion (65) in Problem 2.
Proof. For a system with a time horizon T , we can prove the
result sequentially as follows:
Step 1. To prove the result for time t = T , we consider a
two-stage system for which we consider:
1) The first stage corresponds to time t = 0, · · · , T − 1.
2) The second stage corresponds to time t = T .
We fix the prescription strategy (ψ[p]0 , · · · ,ψ[p]T−1) of the agent
located at the position p ∈ P in permutation o1 for the
first stage. Then from Lemma 13, there exists an optimal
prescription strategy ψ∗[p]T of the agent located at the position
p such that
Γ
∗[p,r]
T =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
T (Π
[p]
T , · · · ,Π[K]T ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
T (Π
[r]
T , · · · ,Π[K]T ), if r ∈ B[p].
(90)
Step 2. To prove the result for time t = T − 1, we consider
a three-stage system for which we consider:
1) The first stage corresponds to time t = 0, · · · , T − 2.
2) The second stage corresponds to time t = T − 1.
3) The third stage corresponds to time t = T .
We fix the prescription strategy (ψ[p]0 , · · · ,ψ[p]T−2) of the agent
located at the position p ∈ P in permutation o1 for the first
stage. From Step 1, we know that the optimal prescription
strategy ψ∗[p]T of the agent located at the position p for the
third stage satisfies the structural result. Then, from Lemma
14, there exists an optimal prescription strategy ψ∗[p]T−1 such
that
Γ
∗[p,r]
T−1 =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
T−1 (Π
[p]
T−1, · · · ,Π[K]T−1), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
T−1 (Π
[r]
T−1, · · · ,Π[K]T−1), if r ∈ B[p].
(91)
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Step 3. To prove the result for time t = T − 2, we consider
a three-stage system for which we consider:
1) The first stage corresponds to time t = 0, · · · , T − 3.
2) The second stage corresponds to time t = T − 2.
3) The third stage corresponds to time t = T − 1, T .
We fix the prescription strategy (ψ[p]0 , · · · ,ψ[p]T−3) of the agent
located at the position p ∈ P in permutation o1 for the
first stage. From Steps 1 and 2, we know that the optimal
prescription strategy (ψ∗[p]T−1,ψ
∗[p]
T−1) of the agent located at
the position p for the third stage satisfies the structural result.
Let Π[p:K]t = (Π
[p]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t ). We can use a procedure
similar to the proof of Lemma 14 to show that there exist
functions
c˜
[p]
T−1 :P
[p]
T−1 × · · · ×P [K]T−1 × G [p]T−1 7−→ R,
c˜
[p]
T−2 :P
[p]
T−2 × · · · ×P [K]T−2 × G [p]T−2 7−→ R, (92)
such that the cost influenced by the prescription strategy ψ[p]T−2
can be written as
Eψ
[p][
C
[p]
T−2(Π
[p]
T−2,Θ
[p]
T−2) + C
[p]
T−1(Π
[p]
T−1,Θ
[p]
T−1)
+ C
[p]
T (Π
[p]
T ,Θ
[p]
T )
]
= Eψ
[p][
C
[p]
T−2(Π
[p]
T−2,Θ
[p]
T−2) + c˜
[p]
T−1(Π
[p:K]
T−1 ,Θ
[p]
T−1)
]
= Eψ
[p][
c˜
[p]
T−2(Π
[p:K]
T−2 ,Θ
[p]
T−2)
]
. (93)
Thus, there exists an optimal prescription strategy ψ∗[p]T−2 such
that
Γ
∗[p,r]
T−2 =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
T−2 (Π
[p]
T−2, · · · ,Π[K]T−2), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
T−2 (Π
[r]
T−2, · · · ,Π[K]T−2), if r ∈ B[p].
(94)
Step 4. Proceeding in this manner, we can formulate a three-
stage system for every time t as follows:
1) The first stage corresponds to time t = 0, · · · , t− 1.
2) The second stage corresponds to time t.
3) The third stage corresponds to time t = t+ 1, · · · , T .
We have shown that the optimal prescription strategy
(ψ
∗[p]
t+1, · · · ,ψ∗[p]T ) of the agent located at the position p for
the third stage satisfies the structural result. Then, through a
procedure similar to the proof of Lemma 14 and (93), we can
show that there exists a function c˜[p]t : P
[p]
t × · · · ×P [K]t ×
G
[p]
t 7−→ R, such that the cost influenced by the prescription
strategy ψ[p]t can be written as
Eψ
[p][
C
[p]
t (Π
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
t ) + · · ·+ C [p]T (Π[p]T ,Θ[p]T )
]
= Eψ
[p][
c˜
[p]
t (Π
[p:K]
t ,Θ
[p]
t )
]
. (95)
Thus, there exists an optimal prescription strategy ψ∗[p]t such
that
Γ
∗[p,r]
t =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
t (Π
[p]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
t (Π
[r]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t ), if r ∈ B[p].
(96)
The structural result presented in Theorem 1 can also be
used to derive the optimal control policy g∗ ∈ G in Problem
1 using Lemmas 1 and 2.
Theorem 2. Let agent k ∈ K be located at position p ∈ P
in permutation o1, and consider Problem 1. There exists an
optimal strategy g∗ of the form
U
∗[p]
t = g
∗[p]
t (Π
[p]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t , L[p,p]t ). (97)
Proof. Let ψ∗[1] be the optimal prescription strategy for the
agent located at position 1 in permutation o1. For any agent
k ∈ K located at position p ∈ P , the optimal prescription
strategy ψ∗[p] is given by (30). Every position p ∈ P is beyond
position 1, i.e., B[1] = P . Using (35) this implies
ψ
∗[p,p]
t (·) = ψ∗[1,p]t (·). (98)
From Lemma 1 we can select the optimal strategy g∗ =
(g
[1]
0 , · · · , g[K]0 , · · · , g[1]T , · · · , g[K]T ) as follows,
U
[p]
t = Γ
∗[p,p]
t (L
[p,p]
t )
= ψ
∗[p,p]
t (Π
[p]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t )(L[p,p]t )
= g
[p]
t (Π
[p]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t , L[p,p]t ). (99)
Note that both structural results presented above lead to
prescription strategy ψ∗[p]t and control policy g
k
t that have
time-invariant domains, i.e., domains that stay the same size
as time increases. This is in contrast with the domain of the
control policy gkt of agent k ∈ K in Section-II where the
domain Mkt grows in size with time. This implies that we
can use the results of Theorems 1 and 2 to write a dynamic
program to find the optimal control policies in permutation
o1 ∈ O. Below, we present a dynamic program that solves
Problem 2 for position 1 in permutation o1.
Theorem 3. Let θ[1]t be the realization of the complete
prescription Θ[1]t and pi
[1:K]
t = (pi
[1], · · · , pi[K]) be the vector
of information states Π[1:K]t = (Π
[1]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t ) in a given
permutation o1. For t = T, T − 1, · · · , 1, and all pi[1:K]t in
P
[1]
t × · · · ×P [K]t , we define the cost-to-go function J [1]t for
t = T as follows
J
[1]
T (pi
[1:K]
t ) := inf
θ
[1]
T ∈G [1]T
{
C
[1]
T (pi
[1]
T , θ
[1]
T )
}
, (100)
and for t = 1, · · · , T − 1 as,
J
[1]
t (pi
[1:K]
t ) := inf
θ
[1]
t ∈G [1]t
{
C
[1]
t (pi
[1]
t , θ
[1]
t )
+ E
(
J
[1]
t+1(Π
[1]
t+1, · · · ,Π[K]t+1)|pi[1:K]t , θ[1]t
)}
.
(101)
Then arg inf
{
θ
∗[1]
t ∈ G [1]t
}
, with θ∗[1]t =
(γ
∗[1,1]
t , · · · , γ∗[1,K]t ), is the optimal prescription selected
using (89) at time t.
Proof. We start by noting that at time t, we write the cost
to-go J [1]t as a function of pi
[1:K]
t to highlight the fact that the
prescriptions Γ[1,p]t in Θ
[1]
t are functions of the information
states Π[1:K]t , as established in (89) in Theorem 1. For the
agent located at position 1 in permutation o1, the evolution of
the information states (Π[1]t , · · · ,Π[K]t ) is a controlled fully
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observed Markov decision process (MDP) with input Θ[p]t .
For such an MDP, this is a standard dynamic program. The
optimality of the strategies selected using (89) is guaranteed
by Theorem 1.
The equivalence between Problem 1 and Problem 2, es-
tablished in Lemma 6, implies that the optimal prescription
strategy for Problem 2 selected through the dynamic program
in Theorem 3 has a corresponding optimal control policy for
Problem 1.
C. An Example
In this section, we illustrate our structural results through
an example of a system with three controller (K = 3). The
state of the system at time t is a 3-dimensional vector Xt =
(X1t , X
2
t , X
3
t ), where each X
k
t is the state of a local subsystem
of agent k ∈ K. The state evolves according to
Xt+1 = ft(Xt, U
1
t , U
2
t , U
3
t ,Wt), (102)
where {Wt : t = 0, · · · , T} denotes the set of mutually
independent disturbances that are also independent from the
initial state X0. The observation of agent k at time t is given
by Y kt = X
k
t . The communication delays among the agents
are given by,
d{1,2} = d{2,1} = 1,
d{1,3} = d{3,1} = 1,
d{2,3} = d{3,2} = 2.
Thus, the memories of the three agents at time t are given by,
M1t = {X10:t, U10:t−1, X20:t−1, U20:t−2, X30:t−1, U30:t−2},
M2t = {X10:t−1, U10:t−2, X20:t, U20:t−1, X30:t−2, U30:t−3},
M3t = {X10:t−1, U10:t−2, X20:t−2, U20:t−3, X30:t, U30:t−1}.
We conduct our analysis with respect to the trivial permutation
o1 = (1, 2, 3). Then the accessible information of the three
agents is given by,
A
[1]
t = {X10:t, U10:t−1, X20:t−1, U20:t−2, X30:t−1, U30:t−2},
A
[2]
t = {X10:t−1, U10:t−2, X20:t−1, U20:t−2, X30:t−2, U30:t−3},
A
[3]
t = {X10:t−1, U10:t−2, X20:t−2, U20:t−3, X30:t−2, U30:t−3}.
The inaccessible information of agent 1 can be written as,
L
[1,1]
t = ∅,
L
[1,2]
t = {X1t , U1t−1, X3t−1, U3t−2}
L
[1,3]
t = {X1t , U1t−1, X2t−1, U2t−2, X3t−1, U3t−2}.
Similarly, the inaccessible information for agent 2 can be
written as,
L
[2,2]
t = {X2t , U2t−1}
L
[2,3]
t = {X2t−1:t, U2t−2:t−1},
and the accessible information for agent 3 can be written as,
L
[3,3]
t = {X3t−1:t, U3t−2:t−1}.
We can define the information states for positions p ∈ {1, 2, 3}
for permutation o1 = (1, 2, 3) as follows,
Π
[1]
t := Pψ
[1]
(X2t , U
2
t−1, X
3
t−1:t, U
3
t−2:t−1
∣∣A[1]t ,Θ[1]0:t−1),
Π
[2]
t := Pψ
[2]
(X1t , U
1
t−1, X
2
t , U
2
t−1, X
3
t−1:t, U
3
t−2:t−1∣∣A[2]t ,Θ[2]0:t−1),
Π
[3]
t := Pψ
[3]
(X1t , U
1
t−1, X
2
t−1:t, U
2
t−1:t−2, X
3
t−1:t,
U3t−2:t−1
∣∣A[3]t ,Θ[3]0:t−1),
which can be simplified using (102) and the fact that the
distribution of the disturbance Wt is for every time step t
is known apriori. The simplified information states are given
by,
Π
[1]
t := Pψ
[1]
(U2t−1, X
3
t−1, U
3
t−2:t−1
∣∣A[1]t ,Θ[1]0:t−1),
Π
[2]
t := Pψ
[2]
(U1t−1, U
2
t−1, X
3
t−1, U
3
t−2:t−1∣∣A[2]t ,Θ[2]0:t−1),
Π
[3]
t := Pψ
[3]
(U1t−1, X
2
t−1, U
2
t−1:t−2, X
3
t−1, U
3
t−2:t−1∣∣A[3]t ,Θ[3]0:t−1).
Using Theorem 1, we can write the optimal prescriptions
of the three agents as,
Γ
∗[1,1]
t = ψ
∗[1,1](Π[1]t ,Π
[2]
t ,Π
[3]
t )
Γ
∗[1,2]
t = ψ
[1,2](Π
[2]
t ,Π
[3]
t ) = Γ
∗[2,2]
t
Γ
∗[1,3]
t = ψ
[1,3](Π
[3]
t ) = Γ
∗[3,3]
t ,
which give us the following optimal control actions,
U∗1t = Γ
∗[1,1]
t ,
U∗2t = Γ
∗[2,2]
t (L
[2,2]
t ),
U∗3t = Γ
∗[3,3]
t (L
[3,3]
t ).
D. Comparison with the Common Information Approach
We believe that the structural result derived through the
prescription approach has the advantage of compressing more
information than that derived through the common information
approach. To see this, note that in a permutation o1, the
accessible information A[K]t of the agent located at position
K in o1 is the common information among all agents in
the system. Thus, the optimal complete prescription Θ[K]t
derived through structural result (85) is the same as the optimal
prescription derived in the common information approach for
all agents in K. This implies that the optimal control action
U
∗[p]
t corresponding to an agent located at position p ∈ P
in permutation o1 generated through the common information
approach is given by,
U
∗[p]
t = Γ
∗[K,p]
t (L
[p,K]
t ). (103)
In contrast, the same optimal control action U∗[p]t , when
generated through the prescription approach, is given by,
U
∗[p]
t = Γ
∗[p,p]
t (L
[p,p]
t ). (104)
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Now, from the definition of the inaccessible information,
we note that,
M
[p]
t = {A[p]t , L[p,p]t } = {A[K]t , L[p,K]t }, (105)
and from (14) we have the relation,
A
[K]
t ⊂ A[p]t , (106)
because K ∈ B[p] for all p ∈ P . We have that (105) and (106)
imply,
L
[p,p]
t ⊂ L[p,K]t . (107)
In the example given in Section IV-C, we can observe this
relationship as,
L
[1,1]
t ⊂ L[1,3]t , (108)
L
[2,2]
t ⊂ L[2,3]t . (109)
Thus, the prescription functions generated through the pre-
scription approach have a domain with smaller size than those
generated through the common information approach. The two
domain sizes will be equal in the worst case.
E. Aspects of Computation and Implementation
We chose to present a dynamic program for the agent
located at position 1 in prescription o1 since the size of every
component of complete prescription Θ[1]t has the smallest size
in Problem 2 for position p ∈ P for o1. For example, for the
agent located at position 1 we have,
L
[1,1]
t ⊂ L[1,2]t ⊂ · · · ⊂ L[1,K]t . (110)
Similarly for the agent located at position 2 we have,
L
[2,2]
t ⊂ L[2,3]t ⊂ · · · ⊂ L[2,K]t . (111)
Lemma 5 establishes the equivalence of optimal prescription
strategies derived in different permutations. Thus, for the most
efficient computation of the optimal control policies, it is
ideal to select to a permutation ok ∈ O that minimizes the
size of the domains of the maximum number of prescription
components. When implementing the prescription strategy, the
permutations allow us to achieve better memory efficiency for
the agents. Lemma 5 also implies that for any agent k ∈ K, we
can implement the optimal prescription strategy corresponding
to the permutation ok from its optimal permutation strategy
corresponding to any other permutation oj ∈ O, j ∈ K \ {k}.
Because ok,1 = k, this ensures that every agent k only needs to
remember the information states (Π[1]t , · · · ,Π[K]t ) for permu-
tation ok at time t. Each of these can be updated through the
new information Z [1]t+1, the current complete prescription Θ
[1]
t
and the positional functions (e[2,1], · · · , e[K,1]) for permutation
ok.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we analyzed a decentralized stochastic con-
trol problem with a word-of-mouth information structure and
established a structural result for optimal control policies with
time-invariant domain sizes. We presented this structural result
by formulating an alternative problem through the prescription
approach for various permutations of the agents. We showed
that the result of the common information approach is a special
case of the prescription approach and that it is possible to
compress larger amounts of data in asymmetric information
sharing structures like the word-of-mouth information struc-
ture than currently accepted.
An observation on our result is that it leads to a large
probabilistic state space in the argument of the prescription
strategy due to the number of information states incorporated
there. We believe that there is room to improve this by utilizing
the relationships between various information states and the
positional relationship functions.
We established that a prescription strategy in one per-
mutation has a corresponding prescription strategy in every
other permutation such that all of them lead to the same
control action for a given agent. This opens up possibilities
of introducing dynamic programs that simultaneously try to
derive an amalgamated prescription comprising of prescription
functions from different permutations. For example, consider
a system with 2 agents. The possible permutations are labeled
o1 and o2. The positions of agents 1 and 2 are p = 1 and r = 2
in permutation o1, and p′ = 2 and r′ = 1 in permutation o2
respectively. Then it may be possible to formulate a dynamic
program to simultaneously find the prescription strategies
(ψ
[p,p]
t , ψ
[r′,r′]
t ) by picking the prescription strategy ψ
[p,p]
t for
agent 1 in permutation o1 and the prescription strategy ψ
[r′,r′]
t
for agent 2 in permutation o2.
Finally, we observe that the prescription approach does not
depend on the information structure of the system beyond the
definition of the memory of the agents. This indicates that
it should be possible to translate these results to different
information structures without being constrained by the as-
sumptions made for word-of-mouth communication. Ongoing
work includes extending these results to more general and
interesting decentralized control problems.
APPENDIX A
Let a[p]t+1, θ
[p]
t , and pi
[p]
t be the realizations of the random
variables A[p]t+1, Θ
[p]
t , and the conditional probability Π
[p]
t
respectively. Let ψ[p] be the prescription strategy. Then the
realization of Π[p]t+1 is
pi
[p]
t+1(st+1) = P
ψ[p](S
[p]
t+1 = s
[p]
t+1|a[p]t+1, θ[p]0:t). (112)
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Since S[p]t is a state sufficient for input-output mapping, (112)
can be written as
pi
[p]
t+1(st+1) =
∑
s
[p]
t ,v
[1:K]
t+1 ,wt
I
s
[p]
t+1
(fˆ
[p]
t+1(s
[p]
t , wt, v
[1:K]
t+1 , θ
[p]
t ))
·
∏
p
P(V [p]t+1 = v
[p]
t+1) · P(W [p]t = w[p]t )
·Pψ[p](S[p]t = s[p]t |a[p]t+1, θ[p]0:t). (113)
The last term in (113) can be written as
Pψ
[p]
(S
[p]
t = s
[p]
t |a[p]t+1, θ[p]0:t)
=
[
Pψ[p](Z [p]t+1 = z
[p]
t+1|s[p]t , a[p]t , θ[p]0:t)
· Pψ[p](S[p]t = s[p]t , A[p]t = a[p]t ,Θ[p]0:t = θ[p]0:t)
]
∑
s˜
[
Pψ[p](Z [p]t+1 = z
[p]
t+1|s˜, a[p]t , θ[p]0:t)
· Pψ[p](S[p]t = s˜, A[p]t = a[p]t ,Θ[p]0:t = θ[p]0:t)
] .
(114)
However,
Pψ
[p]
(S
[p]
t = s
[p]
t ,A
[p]
t = a
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
0:t = θ
[p]
0:t)
=Pψ
[p]
(S
[p]
t = s
[p]
t |a[p]t , θ[p]0:t−1)
· Pψ[p](A[p]t = a[p]t ,Θ[p]0:t = θ[p]0:t). (115)
We can drop θ[p]t from the prior in (115) since θ
[p]
t can be
derived given a[p]t and ψ
[p]. Substituting in (114), it yields
Pψ
[p]
(S
[p]
t = s
[p]
t |a[p]t+1, θ[p]0:t)
=
[
Pψ[p](Z [p]t+1 = z
[p]
t+1|s[p]t , a[p]t , θ[p]0:t)
· Pψ[p](S[p]t = s[p]t |a[p]t , θ[p]0:t−1)
]
∑
s˜
[
Pψ[p](Z [p]t+1 = z
[p]
t+1|s˜, a[p]t , θ[p]0:t)
· Pψ[p](S[p]t = s˜|a[p]t , θ[p]0:t−1)
]
=
Pψ[p](Z [p]t+1 = z
[p]
t+1|s[p]t , a[p]t , θ[p]0:t) · pi[p]t (s[p]t )∑
s˜ Pψ
[p](Z
[p]
t+1 = z
[p]
t+1|s˜, a[p]t , θ[p]0:t) · pi[p]t (s˜)
. (116)
However,
Pψ
[p]
(Z
[p]
t+1 = z
[p]
t+1|s[p]t , a[p]t , θ[p]0:t)
=I
hˆ
[p]
t (s
[p]
t ,θ
[p]
t ,v
[1:K]
t+1 )
(
z
[p]
t+1
)
, (117)
and substituting in (116), we have
Pψ
[p]
(S
[p]
t = s
[p]
t |a[p]t+1, θ[p]0:t)
=
I
hˆ
[p]
t (s
[p]
t ,θ
[p]
t ,v
[1:K]
t+1 )
(
z
[p]
t+1
) · piLt (s[p]t )∑
s˜ Ihˆ[p]t (s˜,θ[p]t ,v[1:K]t+1 )
(
z
[p]
t+1
) · pi[p]t (s˜) . (118)
From (112) and (118) it follows
Π
[p]
t+1 = F
[p]
t+1(Π
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
t , Z
[p]
t+1). (119)
APPENDIX B
In this section, we present the proofs of Lemma 10 and
Lemma 11.
We start with the proof of Lemma 10. Let a[p]t , θ
[p]
t , and
pi
[p]
t be the realizations of the random variables A
[p]
t , Θ
[p]
t , and
the conditional probability Π[p]t respectively. Let ψ
[p] be the
prescription strategy. Then, for some P ∈P [p]t
P(Π[p]t+1 ∈ P |θ[p]0:t, pi[p]0:t)
=
∑
z
[p]
t+1
IP
[
F
[p]
t+1(Π
[p]
t , θ
[p]
t , z
[p]
t+1)
]
· P(Z [p]t+1 = z[p]t+1|a[p]t , θ[p]t , pi[p]0:t). (120)
Then, the second term in (120) can be expanded
P(Z [p]t+1 = z
[p]
t+1|a[p]t , θ[p]0:t, pi[p]0:t)
=
∑
s
[p]
t
I
hˆ
[p]
t (s
[p]
t ,θ
[p]
0:t,v
[1:K]
t+1 )
(z
[p]
t+1) · P(S[p]t = s[p]t |a[p]t , θ[p]0:t, pi[p]0:t)
=
∑
s
[p]
t
I
hˆ
[p]
t (s
[p]
t ,θ
[p]
0:t,v
[1:K]
t+1 )
(z
[p]
t+1) ·Π[p]t (s[p]t ). (121)
The last equality in (121) holds since given the realizations of
the accessible information a[p]t and prescription strategy ψ
[p],
the realization of the complete prescription θ[p]t is determined,
and thus, we can reduce the second term to Π[p]t . Substituting
(121) into (120) we have
P(Π[p]t+1 ∈ P |a[p]t , θ[p]0:t, pi[p]0:t) = P(Π[p]t+1 ∈ P |θ[p]t , pi[p]t ). (122)
For the proof of Lemma 11, we expand the following
expectation
Eψ
[p][
cˆ
[p]
t (S
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
t )|A[p]t ,Θ[p]0:t
]
=
∑
s
[p]
t
cˆ
[p]
t (s
[p]
t , θ
[p]
t ) · Pψ
[p]
(S
[p]
t = s
[p]
t |A[p]t ,Θ[p]0:t)
=
∑
s
[p]
t
cˆ
[p]
t (s
[p]
t , θ
[p]
t ) ·Π[p]t (s[p]t )
=: C
[p]
t (Π
[p]
t ,Θ
[p]
t ), (123)
where the term Θ[p]t was omitted since it can be derived given
the accessible information A[p]t and the prescription strategy
ψ[p].
APPENDIX C
In this section, we use mathematical induction to develop
the proof for Lemma 13 in four steps:
Step 1. We show that the result holds for the agent located
at position K in permutation o1.
Step 2. We assume that the result holds for an agent located
at the position p+ 1 ∈ P in permutation o1.
Step 3. Using the assumption in Step 2, we prove that the
result holds for the agent located at the position p ∈ P .
Step 4. Starting with the agent located at the position K we
can sequentially prove the result for the agents located at the
positions K, K − 1, K − 2, etc, until the position p. Thus,
using mathematical induction, our proof is complete.
Next, we present the fours steps in detail.
Step 1. Lemma 12 establishes that Lemma 13 holds for the
agent located at the position K in permutation o1.
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Step 2. We let ψ∗[p+1]1 be an optimal prescription strategy
for the agent located at position p+ 1 in permutation o1, such
that
Γ
∗[p+1,r]
1 :=
{
ψ
∗[p+1,r]
1 (Π
[p+1]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r 6∈ B[p+1],
ψ
∗[p+1,r]
1 (Π
[r]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r ∈ B[p+1].
(124)
Step 3.1. For the agent located at the position p ∈ P , from
Lemma 3 we have the relation
ψ
[p,q]
1 (·) = ψ[r,q]1 (·), ∀r ∈ B[p], ∀q ∈ B[r]. (125)
We substitute q = p+ 1 in (125) to obtain the relation
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (·) = ψ∗[p+1,r]1 (·), ∀r ∈ B[p+1]. (126)
This implies that
Γ
∗[p,r]
1 = ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[r]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), ∀r ∈ B[p+1]. (127)
Note that the agent located at the position p can derive the
information state Π[r]t for every r ∈ B[p+1] since
1. A[r]t ⊂ A[p]t , ∀r ∈ B[p+1], (128)
2. ψ[r,q]t = e
[r,p]
t
(
ψ
[p,q]
t
)
, ∀q ∈ P, ∀r ∈ B[p+1]. (129)
Step 3.2. For the agent located at the position p ∈ P , we
fix the prescription strategy ψ[p]0 . Then, in the total expected
cost incurred by the system given by
Eψ
[p][
C
[p]
0 (Π
[p]
0 ,Θ
[p]
0 ) + C
[p]
1 (Π
[p]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 )
]
, (130)
the choice of the prescription strategy ψ[p]1 affects only the
second term in (130). Using (127) in Step 3.1, we can write
the second term as
C
[p]
1 (Π
[p]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 )
= C
[p]
1
(
Π
[p]
1 ,Γ
[p,1]
1 , · · · ,Γ[p,p]1 , ψ∗[p,p+1]1 (Π[p+1]1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ),
· · · , ψ∗[p,K]1 (Π[K]1 )
)
. (131)
Let Π[p:K]t = (Π
[p]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t ). Then, the optimal prescrip-
tions Γ∗[p,r]1 of the agent located at position p for all agents
located at positions r 6∈ B[p+1] can be defined as
(Γ
∗[p,1]
1 , · · · ,Γ∗[p,p]1 )
:= arg inf
Γ
[p,1]
1 ,··· ,Γ[p,p]1
{
Eψ
[p][
C
[p]
1
(
Π
[p]
1 ,Γ
[p,1]
1 , · · · ,Γ[p,p]1 ,
ψ
∗[p,p+1]
1 (Π
[p+1:K]
1 ),
· · · , ψ∗[p,K]1 (Π[K]1 )
)]}
,
(132)
given the functions {C [p]1 (·), ψ∗[p,p+1]1 (·), · · · , ψ∗[p,K]1 (·)}.
Thus, there exists a function ψ∗[p,r]1 :P
[p]
t ×· · · .×P [K]t 7−→
G
[p,r]
t for every r 6∈ B[p+1] that gives us the optimal prescrip-
tion
Γ
∗[p,r]
1 = ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[p]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ). (133)
Step 4. By reverse mathematical induction starting with the
agent located at position K, the optimal prescription strategy
ψ
∗[p]
1 for the agent located at a position p ∈ P satisfies the
structural result
Γ
∗[p,r]
1 =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[p]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[r]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r ∈ B[p].
(134)
APPENDIX D
In this section, we use mathematical induction to develop
the proof for Lemma 14 in five steps:
Step 1. We show that the result holds for the agent located
at position K in permutation o1.
Step 2. We assume that the result holds for all agents located
at the positions p+ 1, p+ 2, · · · ,K, in permutation o1.
Step 3. With the assumption in Step 2, we prove that the
result holds for the prescription Γ[p,q]1 of the agent located at
the position p ∈ P for an agent located at a position q ∈
B[p+1].
Step 4. With the assumption in Step 2, we prove that the
result holds for the prescription Γ[p,q]1 of the agent located at
the position p ∈ P for an agent located at a position q 6∈
B[p+1].
Step 5. Starting with the agent located at the position K we
can sequentially prove the result for the agents located at the
positions K, K − 1, K − 2, etc, until the position p. Thus,
using mathematical induction, our proof is complete.
Next, we present the three steps in detail.
Step 1. Lemma 12 establishes that Lemma 13 holds for the
agent located at the position K in permutation o1.
Step 2. We let ψ∗[q]1 be an optimal prescription strategy of
the agents located at every position q ∈ B[p+1] in permutation
o1, such that
Γ
∗[q,r]
1 :=
{
ψ
∗[q,r]
1 (Π
[q]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r 6∈ B[q],
ψ
∗[q,r]
1 (Π
[r]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r ∈ B[q].
(135)
Step 3. For the agent located at the position p ∈ P , from
Lemma 3 we have the relation
ψ
[p,q]
1 (·) = ψ[r,q]1 (·), ∀r ∈ B[p], ∀q ∈ B[r]. (136)
We substitute q = p+ 1 in (136) to obtain the relation
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (·) = ψ∗[p+1,r]1 (·), ∀r ∈ B[p+1]. (137)
This implies that
Γ
∗[p,r]
1 = ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[r]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), ∀r ∈ B[p+1]. (138)
Note that the agent located at the position p can derive the
information state Π[r]t for every r ∈ B[p+1] since
1. A[r]t ⊂ A[p]t , ∀r ∈ B[p+1], (139)
2. ψ[r,q]t = e
[r,p]
t
(
ψ
[p,q]
t
)
, ∀q ∈ P, ∀r ∈ B[p+1]. (140)
Step 4.1. For the agent located at the position p ∈ P , we
fix the prescription strategy ψ[p]0 and select the prescription
strategy ψ∗[p]2 using (87). Then, in the total expected cost
incurred by the system given by
Eψ
[p]
[
C
[p]
0 (Π
[p]
0 ,Θ
[p]
0 )
+ C
[p]
1 (Π
[p]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 ) + C
[p]
2 (Π
[p]
2 ,Θ
[p]
2 )
]
, (141)
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the choice of the strategy ψ[p]1 affects only the second and
third terms.
Step 4.2. Let s[p:K]t = (s
[p]
t , · · · , s[K]t ), θ[p:K]t =
(θ
[p]
t , · · · , θ[K]t ) and pi[p:K]t = (pi[p]t , · · · , pi[K]t ) be the real-
izations of the random variables S[p:K]t = (S
[p]
t , · · · , S[K]t ),
Θ
[p:K]
t = (Θ
[p]
t , · · · ,Θ[K]t ) and the conditional probability
Π
[p:K]
t = (Π
[p]
t , · · · ,Π[K]t ). We use the law of iterated ex-
pectations to expand the last term in (141) as follows,
Eψ
[p][
C
[p]
2 (Π
[p]
2 ,Θ
[p]
2 )
]
=Eψ
[p]
[
Eψ
[p][
C
[p]
2 (Π
[p]
2 ,Θ
[p]
2 )|Π[p:K]1 , S[p:K]1 ,Θ[p:K]1
]]
.
(142)
We can substitute the structural result for ψ∗[p]2 using (87) and
expand the conditional expectation to obtain the relation
Eψ
[p]
[C
[p]
2 (Π
[p]
2 ,Θ
[p]
2 )|pi[p:K]1 , s[p:K]1 , θ[p:K]1 ]
=
∑
pi
[p]
2 ,··· ,pi[K]2
C
[p]
2
(
pi
[p]
2 , ψ
∗[p,1]
2 (pi
[p:K]
2 ), · · · , ψ∗[p,p]2 (pi[p:K]2 ),
· · · , ψ∗[p,K]2 (pi[K]2 )
)
·Pψ[p](Π[p:K]2 = pi[p:K]2 |pi[p:K]1 , s[p:K]1 , θ[p:K]1 ).
(143)
For agents located at any position p ∈ P , we invoke
Lemmas 7 and 9 to state the relations
1. Π[p]2 = F
[p]
2 (Π
[p]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 , Z
[p]
2 ),
2. Z [p]2 = hˆ
[p]
1 (Π
[p]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 , V
[1]
2 , · · · , V [K]2 ). (144)
Using the relations in (144), we can define a function Fˆ [p]2 :
P
[p]
1 × G [p]1 × S [p]1 × V [1] × · · · × V [K] 7−→P [p]2 , such that
Π
[p]
2 = Fˆ
[p]
2 (Π
[p]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 , S
[p]
1 , V
[1:K]
2 ). (145)
Then, using the relations in (144) and (145) we make
substitutions in the last term in (141) as follows,
Pψ
[p]
(Π
[p:K]
2 = pi
[p:K]
2 |pi[p:K]1 , s[p:K]1 , θ[p:K]1 )
= Pψ
[p]
(
Fˆ
[p]
2 (Π
[p]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 , S
[p]
1 , V
[1:K]
2 ) = pi
[p]
1 ,
· · · , Fˆ [K]2 (Π[K]1 ,Θ[K]1 , S[K]1 , V [1:K]2 ) = pi[K]1∣∣pi[p:K]1 , s[p:K]1 , θ[p:K]1 )
= Pψ
[p]
(
w1 ∈ W, v[1]2 ∈ V [1], · · · , v[K]2 ∈ V [K]∣∣Fˆ [p]2 (pi[p]1 , θ[p]1 , s[p]1 , v[1:K]2 ) = pi[p]1 ,
· · · , Fˆ [K]2 (pi[K]1 , θ[K]1 , s[K]1 , v[1:K]2 ) = pi[K]1
)
. (146)
From Assumption 2, the primitive random variables
{W1, V [1]2 , · · · , V [K]2 } have known probability distributions
and are mutually independent. Using this assumption in (146)
implies that we can define a new function C [p]1 :P
[p]
1 × · · · ×
P
[K]
1 ×S [p]1 ×· · ·×S [K]1 ×G [p]1 ×· · ·×G [K]1 7−→ R such that,
Cˆ
[p]
1 (pi
[p:K]
1 , s
[p:K]
1 , θ
[p:K]
1 )
:= Eψ
[p]
[C
[p]
2 (Π
[p]
2 ,Θ
[p]
2 )|pi[p:K]1 , s[p:K]1 , θ[p:K]1 ]. (147)
Step 4.3. Let a[p]t be the realization of the random variable
A
[p]
t . We use the law of iterated expectations for a second time
to write,
Eψ
[p]
[
Cˆ
[p]
1 (Π
[p:K]
1 , S
[p:K]
1 ,Θ
[p:K]
1 )
]
= Eψ
[p]
[
Eψ
[p][
Cˆ
[p]
1 (Π
[p:K]
1 , S
[p:K]
1 ,Θ
[p:K]
1 )∣∣Π[p:K]1 , A[p]1 ,Θ[p]0:1]]. (148)
We can expand the conditional expectation as follows,
Eψ
[p][
Cˆ
[p]
1 (Π
[p:K]
1 ,S
[p:K]
1 ,Θ
[p:K]
1 )|pi[p:K]1 , a[p]1 , θ[p]0:1
]
=
∑
s
[p]
1 ,··· ,s[K]1
Cˆ
[p]
1 (pi
[p:K]
1 , s
[p:K]
1 , θ
[p:K]
1 )
·Pψ[p](S[p:K]1 = s[p:K]1 |pi[p:K]1 , a[p]1 , θ[p]0:1). (149)
For the first term in (149), we use (138) to expand the
realization θ[q]1 of the complete prescription Θ
[q]
1 of every agent
located at a position q ∈ B[p+1] as follows,
θ
[q]
1 =
(
ψ
∗[q,1]
1 (pi
[q:K]
1 ), · · · , ψ∗[q,q]1 (pi[q:K]1 ),
ψ
∗[q,q+1]
1 (pi
[q+1:K]
1 ), · · · , ψ∗[q,K]1 (pi[K]1 )
)
. (150)
For the second term in (149), we apply the result (75) of
Lemma 8 for positions {p+1, · · · ,K} and simplify as follows,
Pψ
[p](
S
[p:K]
1 = s
[p:K]
1 |pi[p:K]1 , a[p]1 , θ[p]0:1
)
= Pψ
[p](
S
[p]
1 = s
[p]
1 , A
[p]
1 \A[p+1]1 = a[p]1 \ a[p+1]1 , · · · ,
A
[p]
1 \A[K]1 = a[p]1 \ a[K]1
∣∣pi[p:K]1 , a[p]1 , θ[p]0:1)
= Pψ
[p](
S
[p]
1 = s
[p]
1
∣∣pi[p:K]1 , a[p]1 , θ[p]0:1)
= pi
[p]
1 (s
[p]
1 ), (151)
for any realization (pi[p:K]1 , a
[p]
1 , θ
[p]
0:1) of positive probability.
Note that in (151) we dropped the term θ[p]1 from the con-
ditioning because it is a function of the other terms in the
conditioning.
After substituting the results (150) and (151) in (149), we
can define a new function C˜ [p]1 :P
[p]
1 ×· · ·×P [K]1 ×G [p]1 7−→
R such that
C˜
[p]
1 (pi
[p:K]
1 , θ
[p]
1 )
:= Eψ
[p][
Cˆ
[p]
1 (Π
[p:K]
1 , S
[p:K]
1 ,Θ
[p:K]
1 )|pi[p:K]1 , a[p]1 , θ[p]0:1
]
.
(152)
Step 4.4. The expected cost to be minimized by the optimal
prescription strategy ψ∗[p]1 is given by the second and third
terms in (141). Using (152), we can simplify this as
Eψ
[p][
C
[p]
1 (Π
[p]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 ) + C
[p]
2 (Π
[p]
2 ,Θ
[p]
2 )
]
= Eψ
[p][
C
[p]
1 (Π
[p]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 ) + C˜
[p]
1 (Π
[p:K]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 )
]
=: Eψ
[p][
c˜
[p]
1 (Π
[p:K]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 )
]
, (153)
for some function c˜[p]1 : P
[p]
1 × · · · ×P [K]1 × G [p]1 7−→ R.
Using (138) from Step 2, we can expand this cost as
c˜
[p]
1 (Π
[p:K]
1 ,Θ
[p]
1 )
= c˜
[p]
1
(
Π
[p:K]
1 ,Γ
[p,1]
1 , · · · ,Γ[p,p]1 , ψ∗[p,p+1]1 (Π[p+1]1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ),
· · · , ψ∗[p,K]1 (Π[K]1 )
)
. (154)
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Then, the optimal prescriptions Γ∗[p,r]1 of the agent located at
position p for all agents located at positions r 6∈ B[p+1] can
be defined as
(Γ
∗[p,1]
1 , · · · ,Γ∗[p,p]1 )
:= arg inf
Γ
[p,1]
1 ,··· ,Γ[p,p]1
{
Eψ
[p][
c˜
[p]
1
(
Π
[p:K]
1 ,Γ
[p,1]
1 , · · · ,Γ[p,p]1 ,
ψ
∗[p,p+1]
1 (Π
[p+1:K]
1 ),
· · · , ψ∗[p,K]1 (Π[K]1 )
)]}
,
(155)
given the functions {c˜[p]1 (·), ψ∗[p,p+1]1 (·), · · · , ψ∗[p,K]1 (·)}.
Thus, there exists a function ψ∗[p,r]1 :P
[p]
t ×· · · .×P [K]t 7−→
G
[p,r]
t for every r 6∈ B[p+1] such that the optimal prescription
is
Γ
∗[p,r]
1 = ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[p]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ). (156)
Step 5. By reverse mathematical induction starting with the
agent located at position K, the optimal prescription strategy
ψ
∗[p]
1 for the agent located at a position p ∈ P satisfies the
structural result
Γ
∗[p,r]
1 =
{
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[p]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r 6∈ B[p],
ψ
∗[p,r]
1 (Π
[r]
1 , · · · ,Π[K]1 ), if r ∈ B[p].
(157)
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